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This article examines the transmission and reception of democratic norms
in the context of liberal peace interventions. It identifies two reasons for
the failure to promote democracy: the strategies favored by liberal peace
actors and the agency of local elites. Drawing on field research in Lebanon
and Sudan, the article argues that liberal peace projects systematically pro-
vide opportunities for local elites to overcome the apparent asymmetry of
power between them and liberal peace actors. It identifies two strategies
of resistance to the promotion of democracy—disengagement and recu-
peration—and suggests that, of the two, disengagement is more likely to
produce a relapse into violence. KEYWORDS: democracy promotion, hybrid
peace governance, norm transmission and recuperation, Sudan, Lebanon.
FROM A SECURITY DILEMMA PERSPECTIVE, CIVIL WAR IS THE VIOLENT INTERACTION
of groups that feel threatened and, in the absence of the state, fight for their
survival.1 From a social contract perspective, civil war results from a breach
in the social contract with a captured state fighting one or more insurgent
groups in society.2 Regardless of one’s favored account, democracy promotion
is an important part of the toolkit of post–civil war peace- and statebuilding in-
terventions. Democratization builds peace vertically; it strengthens the social
contract and builds states that are bound by the rule of law and autonomous
from sectional interests. Democratization also builds peace horizontally by
providing mechanisms of power- and wealth-sharing allowing warring fac-
tions to manage their conflicts peacefully.
In this article, I examine the transmission and reception of democratic
norms in the context of peace- and statebuilding interventions in Lebanon and
Sudan. Located in highly geostrategic regions, these two fragile states have
hosted US-designated foreign terrorist organizations. Sudan and Lebanon are
postconflict environments in the limited sense that interventions followed the
signing of a formal peace agreement. But they are not postwar environments.3
War broke out in Darfur following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement (SPLM). Since the July 2011 independence of South
Sudan, violence has convulsed the border with the old Sudan. Although
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Lebanon’s civil war ended with the signing of the Ta’if Agreement in 1990, in
2006 armed confrontations opposed the Hezbollah and Israel and, in May
2008, intra-Lebanese violence rekindled fears of civil war. In these contexts of
hybrid peace governance, Western actors’ incentives to bring about democracy
should be high, given perceived linkages between domestic conditions and re-
gional and international security challenges.
Why, in spite of strong incentives and relatively sustained efforts, have
liberal peacebuilders met with only limited success in their efforts to promote
democracy in Lebanon and Sudan? What, if any, impact do these outcomes
have on the stability of peace? In this article, I identify two reasons for the fail-
ure to promote democracy: the approach to democracy promotion favored by
outsiders and the agency of insiders as they fight against or adapt democracy
promotion to their own ends. Drawing on empirical evidence I argue that,
under a specific set of conditions, local actors can either sidestep the liberal
peace project or divert symbolic and financial resources intended to buttress
democracy promotion in ways that undermine the project.
Democracy Promotion and Transitions from War to Peace
Since the early 1990s, countries coming out of civil wars have been the the-
ater of liberal peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction missions where
“the presence of foreign military troops [is] used by outsiders to control polit-
ical outcomes.”4 Their ultimate objective is “to create stable, tolerant, more
liberal and democratic regimes out of the wreckage of war-torn societies.”5
Liberal peacebuilders consider democracy promotion central to the
sustainability of peace. In the short term, democracy provides mechanisms
to overcome the deep mistrust between parties and minimize the risk of
spoiling.6 It promises that parties will be meaningfully represented in the
political system and that they will contest elections but will not have to fear
the consequences of defeat at the polls. Some sort of democratic institu-
tional setup, often involving power sharing, is therefore considered impor-
tant to address the short-term challenges of war-to-peace transitions.7 In the
longer term, sustainable peace requires the institutionalization of mecha-
nisms of nonviolent conflict management. To prevent a return to war, po-
litical and socioeconomic grievances that mobilize fighters must also be
addressed8 as undemocratic practices and rules for resource allocation, such
as corruption and patronage, exacerbate grievances and contribute to the
emergence of violence.9
In postconflict environments, democracy promotion refers to the range of
programs and policies intended to transform state-society and intergroup rela-
tions. Donors conceive of peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction aid
not simply as a response to immediate needs, but as a tool that can be used for
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conflict prevention, to promote peaceful methods of conflict resolution, to es-
tablish and foster interrelationships between former enemies, and to dissemi-
nate a culture characterized by the rule of law and the respect for basic rights
and liberties.
Analysts identify two approaches to democracy promotion.10 A political
approach focuses on procedural aspects of democracy such as the conduct of
free and fair elections and the respect of political liberties. It seeks to empower
democrats against nondemocrats through support and targeted interventions at
critical junctures. Examples include election-monitoring missions such as the
European Union’s Electoral Observation Mission in the 2005 Lebanese par-
liamentary election that followed the assassination of former prime minister
Rafik Hariri, the Cedar Revolution, and Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. In
Sudan, the April 2010 elections provided the opportunity for an impressive
electoral monitoring deployment. Indicators of democracy promotion can thus
be measured in terms of the regular holding of free and fair elections and re-
spect for civil liberties using long-standing indexes and measures such as Free-
dom House’s scores.
The developmental approach takes a longer view of democracy as a slow
iterative process of interconnected political, economic, social, cultural, and at-
titudinal changes. “It favors democracy aid that pursues incremental, long-
term change in a wide range of political and socioeconomic sectors, frequently
emphasizing governance and the building of a well-functioning state.”11 This
translates into a focus on three key programming sectors: governance, secu-
rity, and rule of law.
Support for governance activities has stemmed from the proposition that ac-
countable and capable state institutions are a prerequisite for economic de-
velopment. The realization that law and order is a priority in conflict
management has contributed to the growth of security sector reform and rule
of law programs.12
Measuring this more substantive understanding of democracy promotion
is not easy. The developmental approach to democracy promotion overlaps
with broader development aid. Its success is a function of its ultimate ability
to enhance state efficiency, accountability, and transparency. Efficiency can
be evaluated by a state’s ability to tax and provide basic services; reform of
the key sectors of security and justice can be used as proxies to assess ac-
countability. Indexes such as Transparency International’s measures of cor-
ruption capture some of the dimensions of this developmental approach to
democracy. Nevertheless, accountability and efficiency require fine-grained
substantive and qualitative assessments of the kind that are difficult to gener-
alize and systematize.
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Norms and Bargaining in Peace Processes
The liberal peace has come under fire from several quarters. Some question its
ability to achieve stability and deal with “devious incentives.”13 Others fault it
for creating weak states by prioritizing liberalization over institutionaliza-
tion.14 Still others bemoan its inability to build local ownership and pass the
baton to local actors.15 A different perspective argues that liberal peace inter-
ventions are bound to produce hybrid outcomes. “International and domestic
actors enter into a bargaining relationship whereby each attempts to promote
its own values, norms and practices.”16 The resulting hybrid peace governance
allows for the coexistence of liberal and illiberal norms, institutions, and ac-
tors in a no-war-no-peace context. Recent analyses stress the near inevitabil-
ity of hybridity. For some, this stems from the variety of interests and agendas
at play.17 For others, it is the natural outcome when path dependence, timing,
and sequencing contribute to defining the realm of the possible in terms of the
quality of postconflict governance.18 Others argue that hybridity results from
the deployment of incentives and disincentives by international actors and the
limits of these strategies in a context where limited understandings of the con-
text of intervention and the multiplication of policy objectives are likely to re-
sult in strategy gridlocks.19
These approaches contrast sharply with descriptions of the liberal peace
as a space of exception where little if any bargaining is possible.20 Several au-
thors underline the highly asymmetrical nature of power in these contexts.
Liberal peacebuilders can display substantial military might. In Kosovo,
NATO mustered 50,000 troops from thirty-two member countries to deter
spoilers.21 Outsiders can also have the upper hand in decisionmaking when
local institutions of governance are destroyed or local actors are unwilling to
cooperate. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community endowed
its high commissioners with such extensive powers that they were compared
with “Viceroy[s] of India.”22 International actors also brandish the authority of
the pocketbook; democratic conditionality has been a staple of liberal peace
strategies.23 Perhaps more important, however, is the reallocation of symbolic
resources: the promotion of Western norms and values that accompanies im-
plicit and explicit critiques of local societies and the fragmentation of legiti-
macy between expatriates who invoke the moral authority of the international
community and the technocratic authority of their personal efficacy and local
elites torn between the competing legitimacies of collaboration and resistance.
Although an important reminder of differences between highly asymmet-
ric and standard bargaining interactions, this literature fails to acknowledge
the full range of options available to locals in the expression of their agency.
It does not pay sufficient attention to their creativity, capacity, and resilience
and is inadequately equipped to identify “weapons of the weak.”24 While
power and resource asymmetries are an undeniable reality, an abundant litera-
ture on resistance to colonial rule draws on the notion of weapons of the weak
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to interrogate the repertoire of actions available to the less powerful.25 The
massive arrival of international administrative personnel invariably provokes
new social dynamics whose particular articulations require closer examina-
tion. Relations between locals and internationals introduce new resources and
strategies into existing social, economic, and political games. In this new con-
text, local elites can gain access to international organizations and develop me-
diation functions or collaborations in order to avail themselves of the material
and symbolic resources made available by the international community. In the
economic sphere, international actors representing new private and public
sources of capital but requiring local agents provoke a reshuffling of the em-
ployment market as different skills acquire new (at least short-term) strategic
value. In trying to adapt to the massive intrusion of international actors, local
actors might not always have equivalent military might or financial re-
sources;26 however, they possess the upper hand in understanding and navi-
gating the local context. This provides them with a margin for maneuver to
either resist more effectively, ignore and bypass the liberal peacebuilding ini-
tiatives, or adapt them to their specific ends and objectives.
Socializing Locals to Democracy:
Norm Transmission and Reception in Sudan and Lebanon
In Sudan and Lebanon, foreign donors have privileged political democracy
promotion over the systematic engagement with and reform of state institu-
tions in a way that privileges efficiency, accountability, and transparency. This
particular mode of democracy promotion impacted local socialization into
democratic norms and the ability of local leaders to position themselves vis-à-
vis the powerful apparatus deployed by the international community.
Transmitting Democracy in Spurts and Starts
Although foreign aid increasingly overlaps and converges with democracy
promotion, liberal peace actors continue to place—at least outwardly—more
emphasis on discrete events and critical junctures.27 Foreign donors mobilize
in support of discrete benchmarks, the implementation of which is arguably
central to maintaining horizontal peacebuilding and preventing relapse into vi-
olence. In Lebanon, Western donors became increasingly active following the
assassination of Hariri. However, involvement peaked around three key
events: the 2005 and 2009 elections and the summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah
war. And while democracy promotion efforts in Sudan followed the 2005 sign-
ing of the CPA, a spike was clearly noted in 2009 in anticipation of the 2010
election and 2011 referendum on the independence of South Sudan.
Mandated by the CPA, the April 2010 elections were central to the imple-
mentation of the agreement and to the process leading up to the 2011 referen-
dum. Liberal peace actors mobilized in support of their peaceful and orderly
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conduct. The European Union deployed its largest election observation mis-
sion ever with 130 observers from twenty-two countries. The UN basket fund
for elections amounted to over $84 million.28 The election and referendum
support budget of the US Agency for International Development (USAID)
amounted to $95 million. Similarly, liberal peace actors mobilized in support
of parliamentary and municipal elections in Lebanon. Ahead of the 2009 par-
liamentary elections, for example, USAID worked through the Consortium for
Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS) to train domestic
election observers and officials and provide technical assistance to the Min-
istry of Interior and Municipalities to facilitate citizen access to voting and
registration.
This is not to say that liberal peace actors are not interested in vertical
peacebuilding. However, programs to improve state efficiency, accountability,
and transparency are technocratic and, therefore, less visible. During the CPA
period, Canada provided technical support to the Fiscal and Financial Alloca-
tion and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) to assist civil servants in devel-
oping and implementing a fair allocation formula for the distribution of
resources in Sudan. In Lebanon, since early 2010, USAID and the US Depart-
ment of Treasury have provided a technical adviser to support the director gen-
eral of the Ministry of Finance to develop effective procedures for
transparency and oversight as well as strengthen internal controls in financial
reporting.
Not only do political democracy promotion efforts enjoy higher visibility,
they sometimes appear to enjoy a proportionally high percentage of resources
when measured against the level of developmental need and given the role of
socioeconomic grievances in the initial mobilization of fighters. For example,
USAID’s electoral assistance budget comprised a full 2 percent of the $6 bil-
lion envelope that the agency has disbursed in Sudan since 2005. While this
might not strike the casual observer as a large percentage, in spite of its oil
wealth, Sudan ranks 154th on the 2010 Human Development Index. To pro-
vide a better vantage point, the cost of linking the main towns of South Sudan
to its capital, Juba, is estimated at $7 billion.29
However, as stated by a senior human rights officer at the UN Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS), the push for peace is often much stronger than that for
democracy.30 As a result, there is little interest in the quality and content of
various benchmarks in the implementation of peace processes.31 In the words
of a donor official, UNMIS “staked its credibility on holding the April 2010
elections.”32 It thus became more important to hold elections on time than to
ensure their quality. While liberal peace actors certified the April 2010 elec-
tion, many privately (and some publicly) expressed concerns about the demo-
cratic quality of the exercise. When the imperatives of peace and democracy
collide, as they often do, liberal peace actors privilege stability. In the host so-
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ciety, such behavior induces suspicions about the genuineness of their interest
in democratic transformation.
That locals perceive democracy promotion as a selective enterprise is fur-
ther deepened by the fact that liberal peace actors sometimes attempt to steer
events in directions congruent with their interests and that increased interest in
and support for a country can be juxtaposed with conditionality or outward aid
denial intended to weaken specific domestic factions. Following the 2006
Israel-Hezbollah war, Western donors gave to an Emergency FlashAppeal, but
several “exerted pressures on UN agencies and NGOs [nongovernmental or-
ganizations] not to meet or provide assistance to Hizbollah.”33 A few days be-
fore the parliamentary election of 2009, the US State Department suggested it
might suspend its military aid to the country if Hezbollah was victorious at the
polls. In Sudan, “the US government strongly backed the CPAnegotiations, in-
dicating that once the deal had been signed, the US would move rapidly to-
wards normalizing relations with Sudan, including lifting long-standing
bilateral sanctions, providing development assistance, and probably also
bringing a US major oil company to Sudan and facilitating debt relief.”34 Pub-
lic outcry over events in Darfur prevented the United States from making good
on its promises, which left the government of Sudan and its supporters to feel
betrayed. During the transitional period, democracy promotion has often
meant siding with President Omar al-Bashir’s opponents, at the risk of over-
looking their fledgling democratic credentials. While criticisms of al-Bashir’s
behavior were the norm, there was much more muted public expression of dis-
satisfaction with the SPLM leadership’s undemocratic practices.35
In summary, three factors contribute to perceptions that liberal peace actors
are selective in their transmission of democratic norms. First is the prominence
of political over developmental democracy promotion. Second is the tendency,
at critical times, to privilege peace at the expense of democracy. Third is the dif-
ficulty of transmitting democratic norms coherently while simultaneously try-
ing to undercut specific actors for broader security considerations.
Selecting Local Partners
How do local actors, particularly elites, position themselves in the bargaining
relationship established by liberal peace actors as they attempt to socialize lo-
cals to democracy? Much depends on who these elites are. Local actors vary
both in terms of their attitudes toward democracy and in terms of their ability
to develop strategies congruent with their preferences. I first address the vari-
ety of local actors with whom liberal peace actors have to contend before turn-
ing to their strategies.
Fieldwork in Sudan and Lebanon raises concerns about the liberal peace
actors’ ability to select partners who will be both credible and representative.
The first dilemma concerns the paradox whereby warring parties must be in-
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cluded in peace processes in order for peace to hold. Once in power, however,
these actors often constrain democratic opponents from playing an effective
role in postconflict governance. Analysts identify power sharing as an institu-
tional formula likely to deepen this paradox.36 In Sudan, al-Bashir’s National
Congress Party was one of the two partners in the CPA. Highly restrictive
laws, including the media and NGO laws, constrained democracy promotion
in the country. Furthermore, liberal peace actors depended on the govern-
ment’s goodwill to operate in the country. Several interviewees confirmed that
they sometimes exercised self-censorship to remain on the ground. In the
words of one interviewee, “the UN can be threatened with expulsion by a bully
government and its security forces. A former UNMIS person told me that the
attitude was to keep one’s head down to save good jobs and salaries.”37
The second dilemma concerns the choices that liberal peace actors face in
selecting local partners. Should they privilege groups who speak their lan-
guage and share their values but may not necessarily have local legitimacy, or
should they work with representative societal actors in spite of potential lin-
guistic and cultural barriers? In Lebanon, liberal peace actors have privileged
civil society organizations manned by foreign-educated, French- or English-
speaking youth. However, once their limited reach became evident, donors fell
back on communal organizations whose rootedness in society equipped them
better to carry out programs. Thus, many NGOs established to weaken the
hold of sectarian elites on Lebanese society since 2005 have now become de-
funct.38 In Sudan, liberal peace actors relied heavily on diaspora communities.
This was not only the case in the North where the regime had muffled civil so-
ciety until 2005, but also in the South where human resources are a major chal-
lenge. In the words of an interviewee, “this has created an elite of national
NGOs who are becoming a buffer [between the international community and
the grassroots]. Civil society is becoming a business.”39 This is echoed by
Samer Abdallah of the Lebanese NGO Nahwa al-Muwatiniyya who argues
that relations with liberal peace actors professionalized Lebanese NGOs and
squandered the volunteering spirit of members.40
This problem is compounded by the overlap between local conflict dy-
namics and international security issues. For example, in Lebanon, the deci-
sion of Western governments to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization has
limited the ability to interact with a group that garnered 88 percent of the
Shi’ite vote and, in conjunction with its allies, 54 percent of the popular vote
in the 2009 election.41 According to Roger Mac Ginty, “Personnel from one
US-based international NGO noted how because of their USAID funding they
were unable to deal with Hezbollah, even though Hezbollah were important
gatekeepers to the community they wished to assist.”42
In summary, the transmission of democratic norms runs against hard
choices in the selection of local partners. Like the strategies adopted by liberal
peace actors, their choice of partners affects local perceptions of the democ-
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racy promotion agenda. Together, these two factors provide the context within
which local elites develop their own strategies in response to the attempt by
liberal peace actors to promote democracy.
Weapons of the Weak
How do local elites engage with efforts by their international counterparts to
transmit democratic norms? To the casual observer of peace- and statebuilding
efforts, the asymmetry between international and local resources may some-
times seem glaring. Particularly where liberal peace actors have displayed
commitment and interest, they deploy significant financial, military, and
human resources on the ground. This was arguably the case in Lebanon and
Sudan after 2005. Following the summer 2006 war between Hezbollah and Is-
rael, the UN Security Council agreed to strengthen the UN Interim Force in
Lebanon bringing the total number of troops deployed to 15,000, most of
which, as against common practice, came from Western nations. In Sudan, the
deployment of UNMIS and later on the African Union/United Nations hybrid
operation in Darfur (UNAMID) involved a total of about 30,000 troops. At-
tempts were also made to weaken perceived local illiberal actors. Pressure was
applied on Hezbollah in Lebanon through the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(STL) investigating the Hariri assassination. In Sudan, the International Crim-
inal Court indicted al-Bashir and high-ranking members of the ruling National
Congress Party (NCP) for genocide in Darfur. Both countries also received
substantial monies in support of postconflict reconstruction.
Why then were some local elites who were opposed to the liberal peace
project capable of resisting and what strategies did they use to this effect? The
focus on actors opposed to the liberal peace project is not intended to suggest
that there are no prodemocracy elites in either Sudan or Lebanon. However, to
the extent that a bargaining relationship is established between local and in-
ternational actors, one would expect the liberal peace actors to bring the might
of their resources to bear on local opponents or competitors. By focusing on
the local elites’ ability to resist, I shed light on the terms and context of the bar-
gaining relationship.
Liberal peace actors’ choice of strategies and partners affects local per-
ceptions of democracy promotion. They also provide a more or less constrain-
ing environment in which local elites develop their strategies. I suggested that
the perceived selectiveness of liberal peace actors’ democracy promotion ef-
forts and their competing agendas provide local elites with an opportunity to
capitalize on resulting popular suspicions. I also argued that the liberal peace
actors’ decision to interact with or counter local elites affects the stance of
these elites. The more representative the local elites, the more likely it will be
for their strategies to affect the nature of postconflict governance. In Sudan
and Lebanon, local elites opposed to the liberal peace project have relied on
two main strategies: disengagement from the liberal peace project and recu-
Marie-Joëlle Zahar 81
peration of the democratic vocabulary to their own ends. The two strategies are
not exclusive of one another. However, they potentially have different conse-
quences for the nature of postconflict governance.
It is not uncommon in peace- and statebuilding settings to find two (or
more) competing systems of authority on the same territory. Liberal peace ac-
tors and their local partners share authority and legitimacy with a parallel sys-
tem of governance run by local elites opposed to the liberal peace project. In
such instances, the population sees locals who partner with the international
community as collaborators. Such is the situation in Lebanon’s Shi’a strong-
holds in the southern suburbs of Beirut and in South Lebanon. Here, disen-
gagement is facilitated by widely held popular perceptions that aid is
politicized. Buttressed by the selectiveness of Western liberal peace efforts, in-
cluding the US government’s interdiction of contacts with Hezbollah and by
UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which sought to curtail the group’s mil-
itary activities and thus linked the liberal peace project to broader regional se-
curity concerns, a large majority of Shi’a and a substantial minority of
Lebanese of other confessions have come to see liberal peace actors as par-
tial.43 Disengagement is also facilitated by access to symbolic and material re-
sources that do not depend on the liberal peace actors’ goodwill. In securing
resources, Hezbollah can of course count on its alliance with Iran, but one
must also note the efficacy of its organizational structure. “The key to this is
[Hezbollah’s own NGO] JihadAl Bina, which was established to provide med-
ical, financial and practical support to Hezbollah members and its mainly Shi-
ite supporters.”44 Hezbollah has also deployed symbols that resonate with its
supporters and clearly set it apart from the liberal peace actors. The party is not
interested in liberal democracy, Western style; nor is it particularly keen on lib-
eral approaches to the economy.45 Instead, its “social and political activities
operate as an integrated and holistic policy network, disseminating the values
of resistance while constructing a collective identity derived from the notion
of hala al-islamiyya, or ‘Islamic sphere.’”46
Local elites opposed to the liberal peace project might want to sidestep ef-
forts at democracy promotion; often, they cannot ignore the pervasive presence
and resources deployed by liberal peace actors. In such instances, local elites
attempt to manipulate the liberal peace actors’ discourses and strategies to their
own advantage. I call this recuperation, the diversion of symbolic and financial
resources intended for democracy promotion so as to undermine the project.
The adoption of this strategy is facilitated by the paradox whereby liberal peace
actors find themselves forced to contend with local elites opposed to their proj-
ect because sustainable peace depends on their inclusion in government. In
Sudan, al-Bashir has used benefits derived from CPA implementation, includ-
ing the development of Sudan’s oil sector, to bolster his popular legitimacy.Ac-
cording to World Bank estimates, the country’s gross domestic product nearly
tripled and oil turned Sudan’s economy into one of the fastest-growing
82 Norm Transmission in Peace- and Statebuilding
economies inAfrica. By 2006, direct foreign investment had shot up to $2.3 bil-
lion from $128 million in 2000.47 World Bank officials consider that “Sudan
has some of the sharpest economic policy makers on the continent, who have
invested wisely in infrastructure, education and the country’s agriculture indus-
try.”48 Although the wealth is not equally shared, it has boosted the govern-
ment’s popularity, securing al-Bashir’s reelection with a comfortable margin in
April 2010. Al-Bashir’s popularity has been further strengthened by his ability
to place the blame for the breakup of the country as a result of the 9 January
2011 referendum on the independence of South Sudan squarely on liberal peace
actors. That he has been successful can be partially explained by the suspicion
among many Sudanese that Western powers were not really interested in
democracy and that their ultimate goal was to break up the country to put their
hands on its oil wealth. This suspicion was fed by the selectiveness of liberal
peace actors’ strategies and their willingness to reach compromises with the rul-
ing NCP to safeguard the peace and remain in country at critical junctures. The
suspicion extends beyond the circle of regime supporters to opposition leaders
including al-Bashir’s only serious competitor for the presidency in 2010, the
SPLM’s Yasir Arman.49 Thus, his popularity and his victory at the polls have
provided al-Bashir with symbolic (even procedurally democratic) resources
that he deploys to counter the liberal peace project.
Disengagement and recuperation are not exclusive of one another. The
cases of Sudan and Lebanon make abundantly clear the extent to which both
can be facilitated by the missteps of liberal peace actors, themselves a function
of the inherent paradoxes that beset any peace- or statebuilding enterprise. The
two cases also highlight the ability of local elites to adopt and adapt demo-
cratic norms (popular legitimacy) and practices (electoral victories) to their
own ends.
Bargaining Interactions and
Postconflict Governance: Wither Democracy?
In this article, I used the lens of democracy promotion to describe interactions
between liberal peace actors and local elites opposed to the liberal peace proj-
ect. Using evidence from Sudan and Lebanon, I documented the way in which
liberal peace projects, rather than creating a state of exception, systematically
provide opportunities for local elites to overcome the apparent asymmetry of
power between them and liberal peace actors. I also identified two strategies
of resistance to the promotion of democracy: disengagement and recuperation.
In postconflict settings, democracy promotion is a daunting task. Liberal
peace actors hold democratic norms and practices important for the nonviolent
management of conflicts; simultaneously, they are forced to make difficult
compromises in terms of preferred strategies and local partners. Rather than
evaluating postconflict governance in black or white terms, equating success
Marie-Joëlle Zahar 83
with democracy and failure with hybridity, the pervasiveness of bargaining
and the inevitability of mixed outcomes suggest the need for a different ana-
lytical frame. In this article, I argue that disengagement and recuperation are
not mutually exclusive. But is one of them more likely to negatively affect the
stability of transition from war to peace?
Sudan suggests that this might indeed be the case. As the transitional pe-
riod mandated by the CPA came to an end in 2011 and as it became clear that
Sudan would be divided, liberal peace actors lost leverage on the al-Bashir
government. As had happened during the negotiations leading to the CPA, al-
Bashir became frustrated as liberal peace actors failed to make good on the
promises they made to ensure the peaceful holding of the January 2011 refer-
endum. With little else to gain from bargaining, al-Bashir signaled his in-
creasing disengagement by refusing to extend the UNMIS mandate. This was
accompanied by mounting violence in Abyei and in the two border states of
Blue Nile and South Kordofan.
If a dominant strategy of disengagement threatens peace, how does a
dominant strategy of recuperation affect postconflict governance? Lebanon
provides preliminary answers. Hezbollah did not simply disengage from the
liberal peace project; it skillfully used the democratic opportunities afforded
by elections to bolster its legitimacy. The party, which won the 2009 popular
vote, though not the election, is now part of the governing majority. In the past
year, Hezbollah has had to contend with the STL decision to indict four of its
members in connection with the assassination of Hariri. While the party force-
fully rejected the accusations and refused to cooperate with the tribunal, it has
also had to carefully weigh its options. Following the release of the indict-
ments, Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
STL process. He presented “evidence” to the fact that tribunal officers were
connected to organizations, including the Central Intelligence Agency, which
wanted to get rid of the party for reasons having to do with the war on terror.
Tellingly, however, he pledged to act responsibly and not to allow the issue to
cause further sedition or civil war in Lebanon. One must recall that the crisis
between Hezbollah and the Lebanese allies of the liberal peace actors had re-
sulted in a violent flare-up in May 2008. If the core of democracy promotion
is the lesson that conflicts can be managed peacefully, then the outward en-
gagement of Hezbollah with democratic procedures may have contributed to
moderating the party.
This probe requires further theoretical elaboration and empirical testing.
However, preliminary conclusions suggest that any assessment of postconflict
governance cannot be limited to an evaluation of the local actors’ ability to
spoil the process or the commitment of international actors to see it through.
It must also take into account the myriad ways in which locals can evade,
adapt, and subvert the process and their consequences on the quality of post-
conflict governance. 
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